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I.  SECTION 1 
A. Introduction 
A lot of recent media attention and an enormous amount of 
taxpayer dollars have been focused on issues surrounding cyber 
security. Problems arise because many people mean many different 
things in referring to cyber security, and different groups have 
different, often conflicting or even mutually contradictory goals, in 
pursuing such policy. Some companies and users privilege security; 
the government places a premium on surveillance, and users vary in 
their concerns regarding privacy, often not fully understanding the 
relationship between personal and technical aspects of the term. 
Much of the debate around cyber security has generated more 
heat than light, especially in the wake of the Snowden revelations, 
often because those who know a lot about the technical aspects of 
cyber issue know little and care less about government concerns, 
while those in the policy arena are often willfully unaware of the 
technical aspects of the domain they are expected to regulate. 
Everyone can agree that no one wants a foreign country to infiltrate 
their infrastructure or compromise their financial, transportation, 
medical, utility or nuclear weapons systems. And everyone agrees that 
cyber-crime and exploitation are common problems that need to be 
addressed. But very few know how to go about it. 
Many of the discussions around cyber security seem to go 
around in circles with very little forward progress, in part because the 
decision-making that generates such policy remains poorly informed 
and systemically hindered. Here we hope to begin to improve 
decision-making by providing a theoretical rubric for understanding 
the underlying factors that influence decision-making across different 
levels and fields of discipline. In addition, we hope to highlight some 
of the inherent difficulties in developing successful policy within each 
step and between areas of inquiry. We then offer a research agenda to 
guide research into improving decision-making going forward. 
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1. Levels of Analysis. 
By the term ‘cyber security policy’, we refer to policy 
interventions that coordinate and direct resources toward improving 
cyber security. Improving cyber security involves protecting 
computer networks and systems and the users of these technologies 
(including people and organizations) against physical and financial 
loss. Decision-making contributes to the formulation of policy 
interventions at four levels: international, national, organizational, 
and individual. 
Interventions differ across levels. For instance, treaties or 
agreements are used at the international level, laws and regulation at 
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Table 1: A conceptual framework for cyber security policy decision-
making 
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At an international level, the system for mediating relations 
between nation states is not built in a way that allows for inclusion of 
non-state actors, which are inherent to any issue connected to digital 
technologies and the Internet. This, coupled with the dispersion of 
power among states, individuals and non-state actors, makes 
enforcement of international treaties or agreements difficult, even if 
they are agreed upon and enacted.  
At a national level, the lack of national strategy and dispersed 
responsibilities for cyber security policy lead to contradictory policy 
proposals and unintended consequences that ultimately reduce 
overall cyber security. There is often a lack of communication and 
integration between the public and private sector, both of which 
operate in this space simultaneously. In addition, governments and 
technology firms may have entirely antagonistic goals in certain areas, 
including those involving privacy, security and surveillance, as the 
confrontation between the FBI and Apple over unlocking the San 
Bernadino shooter’s iPhone so richly illustrates. 
At an organizational level, deficiencies in the information or 
evidence base with which to make decisions mean that ‘good’ 
programs are not identified and ‘bad’ ones are not eliminated. This 
problem is coupled with, and compounded by, a chronic lack of 
technical knowledge in those organizations with responsibility to 
respond to cyber security matters, and a simultaneous lack of 
understanding of policy needs and processes within the technical 
community. 
At an individual level, loss aversion in a situation that is 
inherently uncertain systematically restricts optimal decision making 
by encouraging individual leaders to revert to automatic and natural 
psychological strategies and procedures in decision-making. These 
strategies and procedures may not be well suited for the complex 
problems or challenges they confront. Risk can be mitigated through 
processes, such as insurance, in ways that uncertainty cannot. 
Uncertainty tends to make people more cautious, especially in the 
wake of potential catastrophic failure; this puts defenders at a 
disadvantage relative to attackers.  
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The decision-making by entities at each of these four levels 
are influenced by various factors, not all of which work in the same 
direction. Various incentives and disincentives, constraints and 
heuristics or biases influence the way in which policy mechanisms are 
developed, or the ways in which people behave in response to policy 
interventions. Some of these factors are unique to one level and some 
apply to many (e.g. lack of information, rigidity, dispersed power). 
It is our contention that the development and deployment of 
policy interventions are influenced by various institutional, 
organizational, human psychological and behavioral, economic and 
political biases or heuristics. These influences become encoded in the 
decision-making mechanisms themselves, which in turn, push those 
who are subject to the interventions to behave or react in ways that 
mirror the biases or heuristics or the designers of the interventions 
themselves.  
The cyber security field is in constant flux, and issues related 
to decision-making are inherently multidisciplinary, which 
necessitates timely, ongoing and integrated research to keep our 
societies as productive and secure as possible. In listing the factors 
that influence decision-making, we draw on the disciplines of 
international relations, economics, organizational behavior, cognitive 
and behavioral sciences, psychology and public policy. 
 
How then can we make better decisions in cyber security 
policy? Section one provides an overview of the obstacles to effective 
decision-making in cyber security policy at the international, national, 
organizational and individual levels. A number of interventions might 
be instituted to try to begin to overcome the various factors that 
negatively influence decision-making in cyber security policy. In the 
third section, we propose some specific examples linked to the 
systemic factors we identify as influencing decision-making in section 
two. The last section offers a research agenda designed to support the 
development of the proposed interventions we discuss in section 3.  
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II.  SECTION 2 
This section provides an overview of the obstacles to more 
coherent and coordinated cyber security policy across levels 
(international, national, organizational and individual) by discussing 
issues within each level, describing what has been done in the past 
and in some cases describing the past limitations to success. 
A. International 
1. Lack of Institutional Architecture to Deal with Non-State Actors. 
 Within international relations theory, the realist school of 
thought characterizes the international system as anarchic. It is one in 
which individual states each act in their own self-interest, unable to 
cooperate out of mistrust of one other. The international system is 
one comprising Westphalian nation states. This model has prevailed 
since the treaty for which the system owes its name in 1648. The 
liberal school of international relations theory called for the creation 
of a set of international organizations and norms to manage the 
relations between states in this otherwise anarchic international 
system.  
The Internet, as a network of networks, is not bound strictly 
by national boundaries in law or in practice, since communication 
across borders in this system is constant. Cyber-security thus presents 
a problem that an international system comprised of nation states is 
ill equipped to solve. So-called ‘non-state’ actors fill the ecology of 
cyber-security, from private companies that develop the software and 
hardware, private Internet service providers, organized criminal 
outlets and individual ‘hackers’, not to mention both business and 
personal users of the Internet. While there is some interaction 
between state and non-state entities, such as relationships between 
Russian law enforcement and intelligence agencies with organized 
criminal groups,1 and between the Chinese military and semi-
autonomous hacking groups, these non-state interests are not present 
                                                 
1 See BRIAN KREBS, SPAM NATION (Sourcebooks, Inc., 2014). 
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within the delegations representing the respective nation states in 
international organizations and fora.  
A patchwork of international agreements and treaties are 
linked to cyber-security.2 One multilateral agreement, drafted under 
the aegis of the Council of Europe, is The Budapest Convention on 
Cyber Crime. Signed in 2001, it is open to non-European signatories 
and has the objective of pursuing, “a common criminal policy aimed 
at the protection of society against cybercrime, especially by adopting 
appropriate legislation and fostering international co-operation.”3 The 
Budapest Convention has attracted 50 signatories. However, it is still 
criticized as being outdated and has not gained the support of key 
countries in cyber security such as Brazil and Russia.4   
On a bilateral level, a number of recent agreements have been 
created with the intention of curbing cyber-espionage between the 
United States and China,5 between China and the United Kingdom,6 
China and Germany7 and between China and Russia.8 Questions have 
been raised as to whether or not the bilateral agreements, particularly 
                                                 
2 See Jonathan Clough, The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime: Is 
Harmonisation Achievable in a Digital World?, MONASH U. (July 30, 2013), 
http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/conferences/2013-
isoc/presentations/clough.pdf. 
3 See Council of Europe (COE), CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME, 
(Nov. 23, 2001), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/Displ 
ayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680081561 (last visited Oct. 25, 2016). 
4 Brian Harley, A Global Convention on Cybercrime?, COLUM. SCI & TECH. L. 
REV. (Mar. 23, 2010), http://stlr.org/2010/03/23/a-global-convention-on-
cybercrime/. 
5 Colin Lecher, US Reaches Economic Cybersecurity Agreement with China, THE 
VERGE (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/9/25/9399187/obama-
china-cyber-security-agreement. 
6 Danielle Correa, China and the UK Sign Cyber-Security Agreement, SC MAG., 
(Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.scmagazineuk.com/china-and-the-uk-sign-cyber-
security-agreement/article/448578/. 
7 Kevin Sawyer, Germany and China Reach Agreement to End Commercial 
Cyberwar, NAT’L MONITOR (Oct. 29, 2015), http://natmonitor.com/2015/10/29/ 
germany-and-china-reach-agreement-to-end-commercial-cyberwar/. 
8 Lee Munson, Russia and China Sign Cyber Security Pact, Vow Not to Hack 
Each Other, NAKED SECURITY (May 11, 2015), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2 
015/05/11/russia-and-china-sign-cyber-security-pact-vow-not-to-hack-each-
other/. 
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the one between the United States and China, can actually be 
enforced and thus will achieve their stated goals. Moreover, the 
agreements leave out other vital organizations such as civil society 
organizations, critical infrastructure, and the government, military, 
intelligence, and law enforcement organizations of the respective 
countries.9   
Finally, attempts have been made to include ‘Internet-based 
surveillance systems’ in the Wassenaar Arrangement, a multilateral 
agreement on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use 
goods and technologies. The proposals to extend the Wassenaar 
Arrangement have been criticized on the basis that, in the long run, it 
would undermine cyber-security by criminalizing the very security 
research activities that result in the identification and correction of 
vulnerabilities in software and hardware.  
2. Diffusion of Power. 
One of the megatrends identified by the National Intelligence 
Council in its report, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, is the 
increasing diffusion of power globally.10 In this increasingly 
multipolar world, power shifts to networks and coalitions made up of 
non-state actors such as private enterprises and individual threat 
actors such as hackers. Ironically, this diffusion and dispersion of 
power is partly driven by vast improvements in communication 
technologies. These conditions make it difficult to implement and 
enforce international agreements even when there is general 
consensus and agreement on a specific cyber security policy at the 
international level.  
“Who do I call if I want to call Europe”, is a quote 
commonly misattributed to Henry Kissinger in reference to the 
difficulty in international relations and negotiations when dealing 
                                                 
9 Richard Bejtlich, To hack, or not to hack?, BROOKINGS (Sept. 28, 2015), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2015/09/28/to-hack-or-not-to-hack/. 
10 See Generally Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, NAT’L 
INTELLIGENCE COUNS. (Dec. 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/ 
organization/global-trends-2030. 
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with a dispersed entity that has no single representative. The quote 
nicely encapsulates the current problem facing cyber security policy at 
an international level between nation states: there is simply no one 
body or entity to call or to convene major stakeholders to address 
cyber security threats or challenges. 
The international diplomatic system has trouble integrating 
the views of entities outside of the Westphalian system of nation 
states. The Internet is a decentralized network of networks that 
involves privately owned entities in almost all countries. In this 
aspect, the Internet’s greatest strength inherently incorporates its 
greatest weakness; designed to survive a nuclear conflict, redundancy 
is baked into its very structure but at the expense of the ability for 
central administration. As with the nation state system itself, there is 
no central controlling actor or actors capable of forcing compliance 
on all participants. International negotiations require the participation 
of these private entities, yet the international system is not built to 
incorporate such actors, and so remains unable to include them in 
ways essential to the success of any treaty in this domain. And yet 
without the inclusion of such groups and individuals, any 
international agreement is doomed to failure from the outset.  
In fact, this diffusion of nation state power is compounded 
by the very ‘empowerment of the individual’ that the Internet itself 
facilitates. This term refers to the way that digital technologies invert 
traditional power dynamics. Now individuals, with very few 
resources, are able to influence the actions and behavior of 
governmental or multinational organizations many times their own 
size. Suicide bombers provide a dramatic example of this 
phenomenon. The influence of individual non-state actors is 
particularly relevant in cyber security. Many of the threat actors in 
this field are organized criminal outfits, in many cases backed 
explicitly or tolerated by the state in which they reside. Widespread 
availability and adoption of commercially available information 
communication technologies grants individuals capabilities to access 
and amplify information previously only available to nation states. 
And destructive effects are not limited only to organized groups, but 
can reside within the reach of individual hackers themselves as well.  
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Effectively controlling such a system through a slow moving 
and rigid set of decision-making rules, procedures and processes, 
such as those that characterize the international system, is an 
immensely difficult task. Even were binding agreements to be 
reached, actual implementation of these agreements presents a whole 
new set of difficulties. And enforcement proves harder still, especially 
in the fast-moving technological landscape. These is a deep and 
persistent, perhaps unfathomable breach, between the speed of 
government and bureaucratic action, and that of technological 
innovation. In such a contest, technology is bound to circumvent 
particular restrictions long before those constraints can be 
implemented. And this is likely to be true for the foreseeable future.  
B. National 
In organizations there are at least four reasons why planners 
tend to fail when attempting to address complex problems.11 First, 
people tend to oversimplify the process of problem solving to save 
time and energy.12 Second, people are overconfident in their own 
abilities, and thus try to repeat past successes.13 Third, people have 
trouble quickly absorbing and retaining the large amounts of 
information necessary to understand dynamic, ever-changing 
processes.14 Finally, people tend to focus on immediately pressing 
problems at the expense of considering longer term or more distant 
challenges or the unintended consequences and problems that 
solutions can create.15  
These four characteristics of poor decision-making help us 
understand why the current approach to cyber security policy making 
at a national and organizational level is failing.  
                                                 
11 See DIETRICH DÖRNER, THE LOGIC OF FAILURE: RECOGNIZING AND 
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1. No National Strategy. 
In the United States, there is no national strategy and no 
long-term strategy for cyber security policy. This creates a vacuum of 
responsibility and an absence of direction and constraint which leads 
to contradictory policy. This inevitably generates the emergence of 
turf wars over the rapidly expanding Federal funds available for 
programs nominally meant for ‘cyber’ purposes, but often directed 
toward other only tangentially related interventions by agencies which 
seek to co-opt these funds for other purposes. 
This is not a new problem, nor one restricted solely to the 
domain of ‘cyber’ for that matter. In 2013, the Government 
Accountability Office released a report entitled, ‘National Strategy, 
Roles, and Responsibilities Need to Be Better Defined and More Effectively 
Implemented’.16 Specific problems identified with the cyber security 
policy approach include: few milestones or performance measures in 
government strategy documents; the assignment of high-level roles 
and responsibilities but important operational details being left 
unclear; and wide variance across cyber security strategy documents 
in terms of priorities and structure, how they link to or supersede 
other documents, and how they fit into an overarching national cyber 
security strategy.17 Little has changed to improve these deficits in the 
intervening years.  
The Department of Defense’s Cyber Strategy, perhaps the 
longest standing national strategy document, provides a set of 
strategic goals but lacks fine-grained, operational details that are 
publicly available.18 The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity 
Initiative was released in 2013 and came with 12 initiatives but did 
not come with an operational plan on how these initiatives should be 
                                                 
16 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-187, 
CYBERSECURITY: NATIONAL STRATEGY, ROLES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES NEED TO 
BE BETTER DEFINED AND MORE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED (2013). 
17 Id. 
18 The DOD Cyber Strategy, THE DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Apr. 2015), 
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-
strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf. 
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implemented and operationalized.19 The Cybersecurity National 
Action Plan came with a set of actions, like setting up a Commission 
on Enhancing National Cybersecurity, and creating a Federal Chief 
Information Security Officer position, and allocated $19 billion in 
funds across a plethora of activities, but did not include tangible 
outcomes and metrics for determining cost effectiveness or ‘success’. 
This is a combination tailor-made for inciting misuse of government 
funds. 
The responsibilities for portions of cyber security policy are 
spread out across dozens of Federal agencies, the Department of 
Defense and intelligence community, regulators and other ancillary 
bodies (like Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, or ISACs). 
This dispersed responsibility, coupled with no overarching strategy, 
creates situations where agencies pursue cyber security policy goals 
that match their organization’s interests but, in many cases, contradict 
the cyber security concerns of other organizations, sectors, and 
people, or produce unnecessary, wasteful, or even deleterious 
redundancies, often even without awareness of such duplication. 
Lack of fully transparent communication between these divisions 
within the government serves to further complicate problems 
associated with disaggregated policy planning and implementation.  
A recent example is the push by FBI Director Comey for 
laws that would mandate backdoors to be placed in encryption 
standards. Were this policy to be successfully implemented, it would 
have the effect of weakening overall cyber security (including the 
cyber security of other government agencies), not to mention the 
ability of foreign actors to access sensitive American materials.  
Another example is the National Security Agency, which has 
a dual mission that in practice is contradictory. The Signals 
Intelligence mission requires that the agency acquire the 
communications of foreign governments (espionage). The second 
mission of the NSA, the Information Assurance mission, tasks the 
agency with safeguarding the information of government agencies, 
                                                 
19 The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, EXECUTIVE OFF. OF 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files 
/cybersecurity.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2016). 
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corporations and individuals in the U.S. The approach is summarized 
as ‘keep our information safe, get theirs.’ 
The Signals Intelligence mission requires that key information 
technology infrastructure, hardware and software, be weakened and 
exploited. These technologies, in many cases are the same ones used 
by government agencies, corporations and individuals in the United 
States itself. The weakening of these technologies puts these entities 
in the U.S. at risk (the revelation in 2016 of back-doored Juniper 
routers, which are used by many U.S. Federal government 
departments, is a case in point). Add to this the fact that US Cyber 
Command, which is the military’s designated organization for 
safeguarding its networks and information, is led by the same person 
that leads the NSA, and we have a muddled set of responsibilities 
with little coordination.  
C. Organizational 
1. Lack of Evidence Base. 
Evidence-based policy making is an approach where policy 
decisions are based on the collection and interpretation of objective 
evidence relating to the policy issue at hand and the performance of 
the policy option implemented. Its intellectual roots lie in evidence-
based medicine, where randomized controlled trials are used to assess 
the policies or treatments that contribute most toward the resolution 
of a particular condition or ailment. This etiology embodies an 
important corrective; fixing one problem in the human body often 
causes another because systems are enmeshed in ways that are not 
always obvious, clear or systematic. Similarly, in a network design like 
the Internet, focusing on simple, easy-to-measure outcomes can 
quickly become a version of the drunkard’s search. Just as lowering 
cholesterol does little to change overall risk of coronary artery 
disease, although the ability to do so with statins makes billions for 
Big Pharma every year, reducing the number of hacks may not 
necessarily mean the overall system is safer. After all, body counts in 
Vietnam did little to provide an accurate indicator of how well the 
United States was doing in that war. Effective decision-making in 
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complex environments requires knowledge about the structure of a 
system and the outcomes of the decisions made in relation to the 
goals that are being pursued.20 Without this knowledge, an 
organization may implement interventions that ultimately exacerbate 
the very problems that it seeks to mitigate. 
In cyber security policy, there is a dearth of reliable, verifiable 
data on the financial scale of the losses, the sources of threats and 
risks, and the potential positive and negative impacts of policy 
decisions. While figures on the number of cyber incidents are 
released annually by the Computer Emergency Response Team (US-
CERT), such figures are methodologically questionable – for instance 
- much of the increasing incidence figures could be chalked up to 
better detection methods and companies have incentives to hide 
serious breaches - and thus give very little in the way of policy-
relevant guidance.  
Where there are metrics available, there is no guarantee that 
they will be actionable, relevant or useful. For instance, since 2003 
the Department of Homeland Security has been operating an 
intrusion detection system, formerly called the National 
Cybersecurity Protection System, now called the EINSTEIN 
program.2122  After over a decade of operation, and $6 billion in 
investment, “none [of the metrics developed by DHS] provide 
insight into the value derived from the functions of the system.”23 An 
estimated $19 billion was allocated to cyber security measures in the 
2017 White House budget proposal, representing a 35% increase 
                                                 
20 See DÖRNER, supra note 11. 
21 It is of great concern therefore that the Cybersecurity National Action 
Plan calls for the Department of Homeland Security to enhance Federal 
cybersecurity, “by expanding the EINSTEIN and Continuous Diagnostics and 
Mitigation programs”. 
22 Aliya Sternstein, US Homeland Security’s $6B Firewall Has More Than a 
Few Frightening Blind Spots, DEFENSE ONE (Jan. 29 2016), 
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/01/us-homeland-securitys-6b-
firewall-has-more-few-frightening-blind-spots/125528/. 
23 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-294, INFORMATION 
SECURITY: NHS NEEDS TO ENHANCE CAPABILITIES, IMPROVE PLANNING, AND 
SUPPORT GREATER ADOPTION OF ITS NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY PROTECTION 
SYSTEM (2016). 
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over the previous year.24 However, it was not clear where all these 
funds were going because there was no definition for what actually 
constitutes a ‘cyber security program’.25 Even data on research and 
development (R&D) spending on cyber security, the release of which 
is required by law, have only been made available as recently as 
2013.26  
The lack of reliable evidence is due to a number of reasons. 
There are strong incentives for corporations and government 
agencies not to disclose whether an information security failure has 
occurred, facilitated in part by patchy data breach notification laws, 
which are set at a state level in the United States, and differ 
substantially in their requirements.  Companies may not want 
competitors to know their weaknesses, and corporations as well as 
the government may not want the public to lose faith that their 
personal financial, medical, or social information is safe when they 
interact with them. This of course assumes that the company is aware 
of a failure in information security having even taken place, which is 
far from guaranteed. 
Where there are data and studies available, the most 
commonly cited data sources are compiled by security or antivirus 
vendors, who have business incentives to magnify the problem, or 
are in studies undertaken by academic institutions or think tanks and 
sponsored by corporations that operate in the field. These studies 
make unrealistic assumptions about the behavioral responses of 
companies, and do not take into account the unobserved differences 
among companies in the datasets. They assume that all companies 
react in the same way to information security incidents regardless of 
industry, size (whether by headcount or annual revenues), business 
model or current revenues, costs or profitability. In reality, the losses 
                                                 
24 The President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2017, THE WHITE HOUSE: OFF. OF 
MGMT. AND BUDGET, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2016). 
25 Middle Class Economics: Cybersecurity, THE WHITE HOUSE: THE 
PRESIDENT’S BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 (Aug. 7, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/fact
_sheets/cybersecurity-updated.pdf. 
26 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 16. 
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that a company might face from a security breach are influenced by 
the individual company’s fragility, which in turn is a function of a 
number of firm-level characteristics including customer loyalty, profit 
margins or debt. For a hypothetical example, if a company with low 
profit margins, low customer loyalty and high debt is subject to a 
costly data breach, and that information becomes public, the periodic 
drop in revenues and curtailed access to short-term debt might 
render the company insolvent. This would not be the case for a 
company with high margins, high customer loyalty and low debt. Yet 
many studies treat all companies as if they were identical when 
predicting or forecasting potential impacts of a breach.  
Selection bias is also endemic. The only companies that 
appear in malware or data breach incident datasets are those that: a) 
detected the incident; b) subsequently reported the incident; and c) 
were able to accurately quantify the impact of the incident. Of the 
entire universe of companies, only a fraction of a fraction is likely to 
be included in this analysis. Simple methodological problems like 
ensuring a representative sample are endemic in commonly used, self-
reported surveys. The total losses across countries are often based on 
extrapolations for entire populations; multiplying the average loss per 
company by the total companies in the country or economy may not 
provide the most accurate estimate of actual breaches or losses.27  
This lack of evidence means that cyber security policy makers 
cannot determine where the true problems lies and where policy 
interventions might have the greatest benefit given their costs, nor 
can they track the subsequent outcomes of the policy interventions 
that they make. This failure then compounds over years as successful 
policy interventions aren’t identifiable and failed policy interventions 
are allowed to persist in spite of their failure.  
With no basis on which to evaluate the need for and 
effectiveness of cyber security policy, there is a risk that the system 
becomes nothing more than a ‘self-licking ice cream cone’: A self-
                                                 
27 Dinei Florencio & Cormac Herley, Sex, Lies and Cyber-crime Surveys 
(Microsoft Research, Working Paper), available at https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/research/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SexLiesandCybercrimeSurveys.pdf. 
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perpetuating process that is meant to address a problem but instead 
contributes to the very problem that it is ostensibly designed to solve.  
2. Chronic Lack of Technical Knowledge.  
The chronic lack of technical knowledge and talent within the 
organizations with responsibility for cyber security policy severely 
hampers these organizations’ ability to effectively develop and 
implement policies. This technical knowledge gap can be attributed 
to there being no standard way in which to classify or keep track of 
cyber security related roles, and to the inability of Federal agencies to 
retain and develop what technical talent they are able to hire. 
Again, this problem is not new. In 2011, the Government 
Accountability Office released a report titled ‘Cybersecurity Human 
Capital: Initiatives need Better Planning and Coordination’, flagging that, 
“eight agencies with the biggest IT [information technology] budgets 
have trouble handling their cybersecurity workforces and determining 
their composition and responsibilities.”28 It remains a persistent 
problem. In a 2013 report, the GAO wrote that, “only 2 of 8 agencies 
it reviewed developed cyber workforce plans and only 3 of the 8 
agencies had a department-wide training program for their 
cybersecurity workforce.”29 The Department of Defense was the only 
agency to report their shortage to the GAO in 2011 (as they were the 
only ones who had a methodology in place).  
This has not stopped government agencies from announcing 
large hiring targets, complete with large budgets, to hire cyber 
security personnel. The Department of Defense announced that it 
would have 6,000 ‘cyber-warriors’ by 2016 but there is little indication 
of where these people would come from (much less what a ‘cyber-
                                                 
28 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-8, CYBERSECURITY 
HUMAN CAPITAL: INITIATIVES NEED BETTER PLANNING AND COORDINATION 
(2011). 
29 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 16. 
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warrior’ does). The Office of Personnel Management was also 
competing to hire 1,000 cyber security personnel in this market.30  
The Department of Homeland Security is the private sector’s 
liaison on cyber security matters – it also advises other agencies on 
the issue. The GAO identified 1,361 cyber security personnel at DHS 
in their 2013 study. One official is quoted as saying, “the National 
Cyber Security Division has had trouble finding personnel for certain 
specialized areas, such as watch officers”.31 This division has a central 
role in operating important interventions such as the EINSTEIN 
system, developing the National Cyber Incident Response Plan, and 
operating the National Cybersecurity Center.  
The lack of any data to measure the problem or outcomes of 
policies to address the problem makes achieving strategic goals, like 
Initiative #8 of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, which 
calls to, “develop a technologically-skilled and cyber-savvy workforce 
and an effective pipeline of future employees,” even more 
challenging.  
Another underlying reason for the chronic lack of technically 
skilled people in government is that government can rarely compete 
with the private sector in the IT arena in terms of salary, stock 
options, prestige and other remunerations. Few career public servants 
have an advanced understanding of technical issues in the area of 
cyber security, and even fewer private sector IT professionals have 
any understanding of, much less interest in, the processes underlying 
the formulation of government policy. At a cultural or ideological 
level, many of those who work in or are a part of the tech industry 
either in Silicon Valley or more generally have a Libertarian or 
Randian bent. They are broadly skeptical of and distrust 
government,32 exacerbating the conflict between government and 
industry in the surveillance versus privacy debate around cyber 
security goals. Even if the government could compete head-to-head 
                                                 
30 GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFF., https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
/pkg/FR-2015-11-10/html/2015-28566.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2016). 
31 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 16. 
32 A compact summary of this set of values can be found in Richard 
Barbrook and Andy Cameron’s 1995 essay ‘The Californian Ideology’. 
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in pay, it would still have to overcome the ideological forces that 
dissuade Silicon Valley from collaborating openly with government.  
The security and screening requirements for many positions 
related to cyber security in the Federal government have created 
obstacles to hiring talent as well. One example is Ashkan Soltani, 
who was in line to work with the White House’s Office of Science 
and Technology Policy after a stint as the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Chief Technologist, but whose security clearance 
application was rejected possibly due to past affiliation with Edward 
Snowden.33 In another example from 2014, the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation stated that the agency was 
considering relaxing its policy, which prohibited hiring anyone who 
had used cannabis in the past three years, because it was so difficult 
to find candidates for cyber security roles who would pass the 
policy’s requirements.34  
Simultaneously, private entities with the skill base to address 
some of these challenges technologically have no ostensible reason to 
include policy experts on their design teams. Government does not 
mandate or regulate such participants, and there is little or no support 
or infrastructure in most technology companies for their 
contribution. On the other side of the equation, it is hard enough for 
the government agencies to find people to manage and secure their 
internal information technology networks, let alone find those with 
the technical knowledge and skills coupled with an understanding of 
public policy formulation and implementation. Both sides are thus 
confronted with enormous challenges to achieving mutual 
understanding and translation of basic needs and goals.  
Finally, government organizations typically set their cyber 
security policy internally as a list of compliance-based check boxes 
that the system administrators are expected to rigidly follow. These 
                                                 
33 Danny Yadron, White House denies clearance to tech researcher with links to 
Snowden, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technolo 
gy/2016/jan/29/white-house-tech-researcher-denied-security-clearance-edward-
snowden-nsa. 
34 Leo Kelion, FBI ‘could hire hackers on cannabis’ to fight cybercrime, BBC 
NEWS (May 22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27499595. 
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check box lists are developed from the perspective of the defender, 
not the adversary, so they are typically circumvented by highly 
resourced and sentient adversaries. Their ‘one size fits all’ approach 
emphasizes attaining compliance over actually directing resources 
towards areas where dynamic risks are greatest for the organization in 
question.  
The management of government agencies also does not 
permit the system administrators who manage their IT networks the 
autonomy necessary to take a proactive approach to system security. 
These rigid policies are the equivalent of handcuffing the security 
guard at the front of the building and then telling him/her to keep 
the place safe from thieves. A long-term effect is that, rather than 
empowering the system administrators to proactively address cyber 
security concerns, this approach drives out the most talented 
technical employees, thereby compounding the already acute skills 
shortage in Federal agencies. 
D. Individual  
1. Heuristics and Biases. 
Clearly many challenges confront our ability to formulate 
effective cyber-security policy.  Not least among these are systematic 
and predictable barriers which exist in the minds of individual 
decision makers and other stake-holders. A few of these merit some 
comment, specifically roadblocks related to loss aversion and the 
difficulties of making decisions under conditions of uncertainty. 
These proclivities can induce a kind of paralysis because people find 
themselves averse not only to change, but especially to risks and 
threats that incorporate some element of uncertainty. 
Loss aversion constitutes a well-known phenomenon first 
experimentally documented in the work of Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky.35 This work elegantly demonstrated human hedonic 
                                                 
35 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis Of 
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA: J. OF THE ECONOMETRIC SOC’Y 263, 261-
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asymmetry.  In short, people are more averse to loss than they are 
attracted to an equal gain. So, for example, it hurts more to lose $10 
than it makes most people happy to win $10. In fact, people need to 
be offered about $25 on average to make them indifferent between a 
bet which can lead to a loss of $10. In other words, most people need 
two and a half times more potential benefit in order to take the risk 
of a potential loss. This phenomenon in and of itself can, of course, 
lead to a particular kind of paralysis since it embodies an inherent 
status quo bias. People will of course seek out uncomplicated gains, 
but if a path also poses a risk, people will, on average, show a 
relatively high degree of loss aversion.  
There is, however, one important consistent exception, as 
described in Prospect Theory.36 When people are operating in a so-
called domain of losses, when things are bad and look to be getting 
worse, people become much more prone to taking risks, including 
quite dramatic ones, in order to recoup previous losses, and return to 
the former status quo position.   
There are a couple of important caveats in this work. Most 
relevant, people will show the opposite tendency, meaning risk 
aversion in the domain of losses, when probabilities are low. This 
explains, for example, the almost universal acceptance of insurance 
whereby people pay a sure cost to avoid the very small probability of 
a larger loss. But note there that these assessments of likelihood 
typically result from subjective assessments and not necessarily 
objective probability, meaning that people can often misjudge how 
likely a given event may be. This would certainly be especially likely in 
a domain such as cyber-security where the base rate of risk is largely 
unknown as we noted above. While it makes sense that any given 
company or entity may want to keep successful attacks secret, this 
lack of transparency makes it much more difficult for the overall 
community to accurately assess the objective threat and share 
important information on successful defensive strategies. This 
secrecy works to the attackers’ advantage.  Greater dissemination of 
accurate information about kinds and types of attack, even within 
                                                 
91 (1979); see also Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 
39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 341-50 (1984). 
36 Id. 
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closed networks, might allow for the development of more effective 
counter-strategies, or even more effective insurance policies to 
amortize risk across the broader system, even if such allocation were 
restricted to specific sectors or industries.  
In policy terms, this translates into some potentially 
destructive consequences. In short, people are more likely to take 
risks that could make things worse precisely when they are already in 
bad circumstances. This can easily snowball to make things a lot 
worse very quickly. These are the times when caution might be most 
warranted, but is also less likely, particularly in an environment 
permeated by a sense of crisis, time pressure or high stakes. Thus, 
policy makers may prove loath to develop policies to implement if 
disaster strikes when things are going well, for fear of offending 
potential allies and donors, because of distraction from more pressing 
problems at any given moment, or due to general status quo malaise. 
However, once a crisis hits, pressure mounts, and that sense of threat 
and risk is precisely what throws decision makers into a domain of 
loss where the potential for optimal decision making is restricted, and 
in the absence of well-developed and rehearsed standard operating 
procedures, catastrophic losses become much more likely to occur 
simply as a result of momentum. Under such conditions of attack, 
risk acceptance dominates, especially because the crisis itself shifts 
leaders’ perceptions regarding the probability of subsequent attack.  
This entire process may characterize decision-making in any 
number of domains but becomes exacerbated by the uncertainty that 
typically permeates cyber-attacks in particular. Decision making 
under uncertainty often proves difficult. In general, such decisions, 
particularly when time is of the essence, are dominated by a series of 
so-called judgmental heuristics37 which provide useful rules of thumb 
for filling in the blanks when objective probabilities remain unknown. 
Their exact operation remains outside the purview of this discussion 
and can be found elsewhere.38 For our purposes, suffice it to say that 
                                                 
37 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124-31 (1974). 
38 See ROSE MCDERMOTT, RISK TAKING IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: 
PROSPECT THEORY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (University of Michigan Press, 
1998) (discussing an application to political science). 
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uncertainty, like risk, can systematically restrict optimal decision 
making by encouraging individual leaders to revert to established 
psychological strategies and procedures in decision making that may 
not be well suited for the given problems or challenges they confront. 
Recall that such biases evolved precisely because in most 
circumstances they offer fast and easy and largely accurate responses 
to the world; in other words, they developed precisely because, on 
average, they allow largely accurate estimates in the absence of 
objective information at the lowest cognitive cost. However, it is 
precisely in novel or unusual circumstances, such as those often 
posed by cyber-security challenges, where we might expect the 
systematic operation of such biases to induce predictable biases 
leading to sub-optimal results.  
However, this need not necessarily be the case. Sometimes, 
embracing the wisdom of uncertainty can precipitate unexpected 
creativity in decision-making. Admittedly, this is most likely when the 
decision-making milieu is not riven by time pressures, which is why 
systematic planning prior to crisis becomes essential to avoid the 
more negative consequences of psychological bias in decision 
making.  Conversely, when planning can take place at a time of 
relative security, the acceptance of uncertainty can help generate 
unexpected solutions and opportunities because individuals come to 
see that the standard operating procedures do not properly address 
new challenges which exist in domains divergent from those areas 
which the original procedures were designed to address. For example, 
standard operating procedures designed to respond to a military 
assault on a physical location will not offer much guidance when the 
attack occurs in virtual space, however real the financial, logistical or 
operational consequences of cyber breaches. Therefore, it is precisely 
the inherent uncertainty of the new environment that offers the 
possibility for new and creative responses, but these are only likely to 
emerge under conditions of calm, not under circumstances defined 
by threat and the risk, where loss aversion will dominate, and risky 
choices become more likely. 
Thus, it becomes easy to see how the same pattern of 
unproductive and unresponsive decision-making recurs. When the 
problem is not salient, it is easier not to do anything, but under 
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conditions of threat, risky choices predominate, which may not 
necessarily help future outcomes. As Einstein said, the definition of 
insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a 
different result. However, if we change the approach, and embrace 
the creative possibilities present under conditions of uncertainty in 
times of calm, it may then become possible to harness human 
psychological tendencies in our own favor to develop more creative 
solutions to novel problems. 
III.  SECTION 3 
A. Developing Governance Models that Manage to Diffuse Power 
and Non-State Actors 
The international system has to adapt to a world that is vastly 
different from that which it was built to manage. Effective cyber 
security policy development and implementation at an international 
level will require bringing nation states together with private 
companies, the technical community, non-governmental 
organizations, and individual hackers. Faced with diffused power 
across many linked entities, decision-making structures and processes 
themselves have to be more adaptable, flexible, bottom-up, and 
resilient. As with many contemporary global challenges, there is a 
need for governance mechanisms unlike those that were used to 
govern the more kinetic international challenges, which dominated 
international relations prior-to and during the 20th century. 
A number of international organizations are attempting to 
take responsibility for various aspects of cyber security policy at the 
international level. For example, in 2014, the United Nation’s 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) called for, 
“Strengthening the role of ITU in building confidence and security in 
the use of information and communication technologies.”39 The 
                                                 
39 International Telecommunications Union [ITU] (2014), Resolution 140 
rev Busan 2014: Strengthening the role of ITU in building confidence and security 
in the use of information and communication technologies, 
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ITU membership brings together governments and the private sector 
(including Sector Members, Associates and Academia) to forge 
agreements on radio communications standards and increasing 
development through greater access to information and 
communication technologies (ICTs).  
The problem for organizations such as the United Nations 
and other international fora is that they either do not or can only 
partially include the diverse state and non-state stakeholders that 
comprise the cyber security field. In addition, their typical programs 
of work have timelines that span many years. In the time it takes to 
complete one cycle, a field like cyber security usually moved on to 
new and more pressing issues.  
One model worth examining more closely is the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), which has done a good job over the 
past two decades providing a forum in which technical experts and 
organizations can come together to make decisions relating to the 
technical architecture on which the Internet operates. This process 
has been effective because of its open format – anyone can join the 
meetings – its rough consensus system for reaching agreement, and 
the Request for Proposal system, which ensures that all participants 
have an opportunity to make proposals and then debate these 
proposals. These characteristics have resulted in technically robust 
and agreed upon technical standards and outcomes for the Internet.  
B. National – A National Cyber Security Plan 
Following Dörner’s original findings, addressing complex 
problems requires the establishment of an overall plan with clear 
goals, a ‘systems level’ understanding of the environment in which 
the plan will be executed, and iterative revision of the plan in 
response to information updates on the state of play. Components of 
a coherent plan to guide cyber security policy at a national level 
include a long-term strategy with clear goals, milestones, performance 
targets, resources, and responsibilities. 
                                                 
https://www.itu.int/en/action/cybersecurity/Documents/Resolutions/pp-
14_Res. 130.pdf (last visited March 7, 2016). 
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For the first time, as a follow-up to the 30-day ‘cyber sprint’,40 
an operational plan was released on October 30, 2015 to upgrade 
Federal cyber security in the United States. The White House 
Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan (CSIP) was intended, “to 
identify and address critical cyber security gaps and emerging 
priorities, and make specific recommendations to address those gaps 
and priorities.”41 It had 5 overarching objectives: 
• Prioritized identification and protection of high value 
information and assets; 
• Timely detection of and rapid response to cyber 
incidents; 
• Rapid recovery from incidents when they occur and 
accelerated adoption of lessons learned from the Sprint 
assessment; 
• Recruitment and retention of the most highly-qualified 
cyber security workforce talent the Federal Government 
can bring to bear; and 
• Efficient and effective acquisition and deployment of 
existing and emerging technology. 
                                                 
40 After realizing that over 14 million personnel records had been stolen 
from the U.S. government Office of Personnel Management, a 30 day 
‘cybersecurity sprint’ was announced. The goal was to take, “number of steps to 
further protect Federal information and assets and improve the resilience of 
Federal networks”. In tangible terms, some steps included the patching of critical 
vulnerabilities, acceleration of the implementation of multi-factor authentication, 
and tightening of policies and practices for privileged users. Progress reports were 
required after 30 days (The White House, 2015c). What’s extraordinary is that, after 
tens of billions of dollars in prior investment, these basic steps had not yet been 
implemented. 
41 Memorandum from The Executive Office of the President to Heads 
of Executive Departments and Agencies (Oct. 30, 2015), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2016/m-16-
04.pdf. 
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Each of these 5 objectives was given a set of concrete goals 
linked to the achievement of the objectives. Its timeline clearly laid 
out the steps that had to be taken, and allocated responsibility to the 
respective organizations in order to achieve the stated objectives 
before September 2016.  
This plan was a major first step in a very narrow part of the 
U.S. Federal Government’s efforts to implement basic cyber-security 
measures among selected Federal departments. This approach should 
be replicated to cover cyber-security policy nationally for the public 
and private sectors.  
As a part of the development of this plan, a clearer and less 
contradictory allocation of authority and responsibilities for key 
portions of cyber security policy is required. The announcement of a 
Chief Information Security Officer, who focuses on coordinating 
cyber security across federal agencies, and is housed within the Office 
of Management and Budget at the White House, is a promising first 
step in this direction.42 
However, the announcement of the possibility that the 
Signals Intelligence and Information Assurance responsibilities within 
NSA may be merged, two functions that are in practice contradictory, 
was a possible step in the wrong direction.43 A far better alternative 
would have been to allocate the Signals Intelligence mission to the 
NSA, the government and military Information Assurance mission to 
US Cyber Command (which would have to be led by a different 
person than the head of the NSA), and the private sector 
Information Assurance mission allocated to where it resides at 
present with the Department of Homeland Security (with the Chief 
Information Security Officer potentially playing an oversight or 
coordination role). Such an arrangement would have avoided the 
                                                 
42 Danny Yadron, White House seeks its first ever chief information officer, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb 
/09/white-house-seeks-first-chief-information-security-officer-hackers-
cybersecurity-hacking. 
43 Danny Yadron, NSA merging anti-hacker team that fixes security holes with 
one that uses them, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2016/feb/03/nsa-hacker-cybersecurity-intelligence. 
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prior conflict of interest by separating the offensive capabilities, by 
housing them in the Department of Defense, from the defensive 
capabilities, by housing them in the Department of Homeland 
Security.  
C. Organizational 
 1. Improving the Evidence Base.  
More robust evidence would contribute greatly to better 
cyber security policy and filling the chronic lack of technical 
knowledge that has emerged in Federal agencies.  Creating a 
mechanism where private companies are required to report breaches 
while ensuring the secrecy of such information might go far toward 
creating a more comprehensive data base, while assuring such firms 
that their leaks would not risk unnecessary public distrust or the 
exposure of proprietary code or information.  
There needs to be standard definitions for what cyber security 
budget spending actually constitutes and agreed measures for the 
results or outcomes of these budget items. This is necessary so that 
money nominally allocated to ‘cyber security’ is not used for other 
purposes merely because its meaning can be easily morphed; the 
result of a policy produced through such aggregation would be hap-
hazard at best, lacking integration and overall strategy. This is akin to 
asking for the input and output measures for cyber security policies. 
With these measures in hand, the outcomes of cyber security policy 
interventions can be evaluated.  
Of all fields, development economics might have tools for 
potential use in testing cyber security policy interventions. For 
instance, the logical framework approach (log-frames) has been used 
for decades to design interventions in many complex fields (e.g. 
agriculture, education, health) by identifying goals, tying actions to 
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those goals, and then evaluating the intervention according to pre-
established metrics.44  
Borrowing from the medical field, development economics 
and development aid organizations have some well-developed tools 
and principles for the monitoring and evaluation of interventions in 
complex systems.45 Participants are randomly allocated to one of two 
groups, only one of these groups is given the intervention, and then 
the differences between the groups post-intervention are measured 
so as to determine its effectiveness or efficiency. However, as with 
the human body, the Internet is a large network, meaning that 
changes in one place may affect other parts of the system in 
unintended or unanticipated ways, and attention to such feedback 
loops remains an important part of not making things worse by 
providing a series of bandages that do nothing to stop the bleeding 
(or to prevent later problems such as infections).  
Lessons from this field could be drawn and deployed to give 
cyber security policy makers a toolkit with which to classify their 
budget items in a consistent way (the inputs). This then allows 
measures of the effects of these policies across metrics like the 
number of breaches per year, or the proportion of designated high-
value information that is encrypted, or any measure that is deemed 
appropriate (the outputs) to be developed, and used to adjust, 
eliminate or add various program elements to improve performance. 
2. Specialized Track for Technical Talent. 
To improve the level of technical talent in cyber security roles 
within government agencies, a specialized track for this talent – 
                                                 
44 See D. McLean, The Logical Framework In Research Planning And Evaluation 
1-11 (ISNAR, Working Paper No. 12, 1988); see also Guidance on using the revised 
Logical Framework, DEPARTMENT FOR INT’L DEV. (Jan. 2011), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/253889/using-revised-logical-framework-external.pdf. 
45 See Esther Duflo & Michael Kremer, Use of Randomization in the 
Evaluation of Development Effectiveness, http://economics.mit.edu/files/2785 (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2016); see also Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo, The Experimental 
Approach to Development Economics, 1 ANN. REV. ECON. 151, 151-78 (2009). 
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subject to different working conditions and hiring requirements than 
typical positions – is one avenue worth exploring. Indeed, as part of 
the Cybersecurity National Action Plan (CNAP), a $62 million 
educational fund was created, “for Americans who wish to obtain 
cybersecurity education and serve their country in the civilian Federal 
government.”46 This was an extension of the already-established 
National Science Foundation’s and Department of Homeland 
Security’s CyberCorps Scholarship for Service program and a sort of 
Reserve Officer Training Corps program for new cyber security 
talent.47 Such a program provides long term benefits to recipients as 
well as government agencies as a larger pool of experts is recruited 
and cultivated. 
Other existing initiatives might provide lessons for this or 
other special training initiatives. One might be the US Digital Services 
(USDS), which was originally modeled on the United Kingdom’s 
Government Digital Service. The USDS is housed within The White 
House Office of Management and Budget that brings technical, 
policy and legal professionals and places them in Federal agencies 
where technical talent is lacking. They take a human centered design 
approach to the use of technology to make government departments 
more responsive and accessible to people. They have projects 
running in areas that have been deemed priorities by the Obama 
administration including Veteran’s Affairs, Department of Homeland 
Security (linked to immigration, not cyber security), Social Security 
and the IRS. Their annual budget is partially covered by Congress 
and partly comes from the partner agencies where their members 
work.  
Another model that might be worth emulating is the 
Jefferson Science Fellowship Program. This program has existed 
since 2003 and allows tenured, or similarly ranked, academic 
scientists, engineers and physicians from U.S. institutions of higher 
learning to spend one year in Washington D.C. at the U.S. 
                                                 
46 The President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2017, supra note 24. 
47 See Sean Gallagher, Obama wants you to join CyberCorps Reserve to help feds 
get their act together, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 9, 2016), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2016/02/obama-wants-you-join-the-cybercorps-reserve-to-help-feds-get-
their-act-together/. 
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Department of State or the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID). A similar program might be developed for 
cyber security talent, in U.S. higher education establishments or even 
private sector companies (given that some of the best talent resides in 
the financial sector), to do a yearlong service in government agencies 
where their technical talent or specialized knowledge could be used to 
improve the organization’s cyber security or strategy in this area. 
Such a program might also potentiate important and on-going social 
networks between government and technical experts, and allow each 
to achieve a greater understanding of the other’s needs, incentives, 
goals and constraints.  
Each of these programs may not be able to compete 
financially with the private section, but by harnessing existing talent, 
supporting emerging talent, and trying to attach service and prestige 
to government work, such strategies can help to improve the current 
reservoir of skill within existing agencies.  
D. Individual 
Of course, the structural incentives identified can be shifted 
through organizational changes to induce greater compliance and 
attention to issues surrounding cyber security, including enhanced 
transparency and improved integration and communication across 
agencies tasked with different but overlapping goals. But ultimately 
the causal agents within any organization are individuals who remain 
subject to the inherent psychological biases we discussed above.  
1. Transparently Structured Choices and Consequences.  
It is not easy, but there are some standard ways to reduce 
individual’s susceptibility to such biases.48 First among these is simply 
to make people aware of the unconscious biases that may affect their 
judgment and decision-making. The simplest way to do this is not 
through complicated, time-consuming, expensive training programs 
during which people zone out. Rather, the idea is to make sure that 
                                                 
48 See supra note 35, at Id. 
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choices are structured in a transparent way so that such biases 
become evident. For example, in the classic experiment where people 
had to make real life choices between radiation and surgery for 
cancer, options were presented with “mortality” and “survival” 
statistics side by side. When this is done, the equivalency of the 
options becomes immediately evident, but the psychological pull 
across framing also remains obvious. In a similar manner, choices 
between options in response to a particular threat should present 
both the costs and benefits of options side by side, not only for the 
relevant choices, as is often typically done, but also relative to the 
status quo (i.e. doing nothing) option so that costs and consequences 
of inaction become as immediately salient as those associated with 
any given course of action.  
Because people are preternaturally preoccupied with loss, it is 
important to find ways to convey not only probabilities, but also help 
people to better understand how to psychologically calibrate the 
meaning of abstract probabilities. The human mind does not do well 
with very large numbers; we are all aware of the phenomenon of 
“crisis fatigue” whereby one dead boy on a beach is a tragedy but 
hundreds of thousands of refugees pouring into Europe from Syria is 
an immigration challenge that provokes border controls and political 
hostility.   
These numeracy challenges can play out in myriad ways. One 
of the best ways to help decision makers contemplate very large data 
breaches is to encourage strategies or procedures for transforming 
such issues into very direct and small scale terms. Human psychology 
is much better suited for solving smaller scale problems; it is much 
easier for people to get a handle on and contemplate how to respond 
in a constructive way to challenges that are framed in local terms. So, 
for example, we can worry about threats to the electrical grid but the 
initial policy problem that needs to be solved and addressed might be 
better facilitated if it was framed in terms of how to get electricity 
back up in Washington, D.C. without cyber capacity, and then scale 
up from these more local decisions to national policy plans.  
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2. Training through Gaming and other Table-Top Simulations for 
Emotion Regulation. 
 Importantly, as much as the Western canon has taught 
professionals to privilege rationality over emotion, rationality as 
posited by economists in particular is little more than an intellectual 
construct completely devoid of psychological reality. Psychological 
rationality is deeply emotional by design; the human mind privileges 
emotional information since that is what has been key to survival in 
the face of myriad threats over millennial time. This means that 
people are exquisitely sensitive to emotional inputs, perhaps overly so 
in modern contexts, but as with loss aversion, we are more attentive 
to negative emotions such as fear and anger than more positive ones 
such as hope and joy.   
Negative emotions, while important and useful for helping us 
to properly allocate energy and attention, and also to consolidate 
memory, can nonetheless encourage over-reactions to threats and 
attacks, especially uncertain ones that pose an ambiguous or 
uncertain risk. Encouraging training for emotion regulation would be 
time and money well spent to reduce the risk of over-reaction to 
uncertain or threatening stimuli. Enormous amounts of evidence 
now exist documenting the benefits of mindfulness based stress 
reduction strategies in achieving such goals.49 
Moreover, this is a domain in which gaming and other table-
top simulations positing different kinds of threats and crises could 
prove helpful in giving people an engaging, even fun, way to gain 
practice, experience and knowledge about potential response options 
to any given scenario. Such strategies also work to build a sense of 
community and camaraderie among those who would have to work 
together in a real crisis. In this way, issues of dominance, 
specialization of labor and other issues which can interfere with 
effective, time-sensitive responses, can be negotiated prior to the 
actual crisis, so that when real challenges emerge, team coordination 
and cooperation can be as smooth as might reasonably be expected.   
                                                 
49 See P.R. Goldin & J.J. Gross, Effects of mindfulness-based stress reduction 
(MBSR) on emotion regulation in social anxiety disorder, 10 EMOTION 83, 83-91 (2010). 
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IV.  SECTION 4 
Research will be required to translate many of the proposals 
made in the section above into the cyber security policy field. This 
section outlines a research agenda that is intended to provide some 
guidance on the kinds of research questions that might profitably be 
pursued and the research methods that might help yield useful 
answers.  
A. Developing Governance Models that Manage to Diffuse Power 
and Non-State Actors 
An examination of governance models that have either been 
designed to coordinate diffuse entities, or that have proven to be 
successful in coordinating diffuse entities, would be a useful step 
forward in determining a global governance model for cyber security 
policy. This paper has already mentioned the IETF as a model that 
has proven successful in the past for managing technical matters 
related to the Internet globally.  
Perhaps there are lessons to be drawn from global 
governance models in other areas of public health policy, such as the 
World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control, or 
in conflict mitigation and resource sharing, such as the Arctic 
Council, or in the establishment of international law, such as the 
United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea? 
A comparative examination of these varied arrangements 
would look at the types of parties involved, the mechanisms by which 
decisions are made and consensus is achieved, the cost of setting up 
and maintaining the mechanism (and by whom this cost is borne), the 
success of the mechanism in achieving its stated objectives, and the 
reasons for failure should failure be experienced.  
One of the challenges with devising a new set of governance 
strategies with the flexibility and adaptivity that would allow both 
state and non-state actors, including businesses, to engage is that the 
Internet itself, as a network of networks, and the World Wide Web, 
run contrary to most established forms of government structure, 
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which are hierarchical in nature. While originally hailed as a 
mechanism to survive and enhance resilience in the case of nuclear 
war, and later as a means by to encourage and facilitate greater 
democratic involvement, the Internet also provides a platform where 
individuals with very few resources can exert almost unprecedented 
damage and destruction. This structure challenges those who wish to 
provide an interface between hierarchical and horizontal governance 
structures to offer a different kind of structure. 
One kind of structure that might potentially be considered 
involves the notion of panarchy as developed by Buzz Holling and 
colleagues50 in their work on environmental sustainability. This work 
developed out of examining how systems in nature achieve balance 
across large systems over time. In this concept, three factors of 
capacity, connectedness and resilience emerge most prominent.  
The Internet itself offers almost limitless potential for 
connectedness and great potential for resilience, but this framework 
raises stark concern about the relative capacity of predator and prey. 
However, this is where another biological model might prove useful 
and instructive. Well-established equations such as the Lotka-
Volterra51 which characterizes the predator-prey dynamic would allow 
similar mathematical modeling of the dynamic interaction between 
hackers, governments and the businesses who try to survive and 
thrive in cyber space. Although originally developed in a biological 
context to represent the impact of disease and competition among 
animals as a function of numbers, time and rates of interaction to 
measure prospects for survival or extinction, it has long been used in 
                                                 
50 C.S. Holling, Understanding the complexity of economic, ecological, and social 
systems, 4 Ecosystems 390, 390-405 (2001); Brian Walker et al., Resilience, adaptability 
and transformability in social-ecological systems, 9 Ecology and Soc’y (2004). 
51 A.J. Lotka, Contribution to the Theory of Periodic Reaction, 14 J. OF 
PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY 271, 271-74 (1910); A.J. Lotka, Analytical Note on Certain 
Rhythmic Relations in Organic Systems, 6 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 
OF THE U.S. 410, 410-15 (1920); A.J. LOTKA, ELEMENTS OF PHYSICAL BIOLOGY, 
71-274 (Williams and Wilkins, 1925); VITO VOLTERRA, VARIATIONS AND 
FLUCTUATIONS OF THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS IN ANIMAL SPECIES LIVING 
TOGETHER (R.N. Chapman ed., 1931). 
DOCUMENT5 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:1 
66 
economics to model interaction of sectors in industries as well,52 and 
could readily be adapted for use in the context of cyber competition. 
It has more recently been used successfully to characterize the 
maintenance of cultures of honor in environments with aggressive 
actors and weak institutions, a condition not unlike the current state 
of Internet governance. 
This model offers important insight because although it 
makes a number of important simplifying assumptions, it also 
highlights how the evolution of predator and prey influence each 
other. In an evolutionary context, predators select for characteristics 
that will enhance their ability to find and capture prey, just as prey 
select for traits that increase their ability to hide, escape or otherwise 
evade predation. These selection features influence the oscillation 
dynamics of each side in the equation, precipitating cycles of 
dominance, but because the goals of predator and prey are 
antagonistic, the selection of mutually antipathetic characteristics 
profoundly affects the dynamics of their interaction as well as 
prospects for survival. These biological models, which exist in well-
developed differential equations, and have already been used to 
positive effect in economics, offer concrete ways to examine the 
interaction between hackers and defenders, regardless of which sides 
governments or businesses may be on.  
B. A National Cyber Security Plan 
The first step in developing a national cyber security plan 
requires examining what has been done in other countries in the past, 
as well as seeking to develop innovative solutions for our own 
particular needs and goals. To date, there is limited comparative 
literature on the national cyber security plans deployed in countries 
such as Singapore’s 5 year National Cyber Security Masterplan, the 
United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Strategy, and Canada’s 
Cyber Security Strategy, among many others. 
                                                 
52 R.M. Goodwin, A Growth Cycle, in SOCIALISM, CAPITALISM AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH (C.H. Feinstein ed., 1967). 
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Comparing the success of other country’s plans - which have 
clear goals, action plans, metrics for success, timelines and 
responsible agencies - would allow for a comprehensive plan to be 
written in the United States that learns from the successes and 
failures of others (rather than repeating any recognized mistakes).  
C. Specialized Track for Technical Talent 
The first step in considering new policy proposals should be a 
pre-feasibility study based on cost-benefit analysis. A cost-benefit 
analysis would look at the financial cost, both to the host 
organization that would pay for the awardee’s stipend, and to the 
organization from which the awardee is seconded. It then becomes 
possible to compare this dollar amount to the benefits that would 
accrue to the host organization and to the alternative policy option of 
training or hiring talent from scratch. If the costs outweigh the 
benefits by a certain ratio, then this policy option may not be worth 
pursuing.  
The point of comparing this specialized track to training or 
hiring from scratch is important. The major strength of creating a 
specialized track for bringing technical talent into government for the 
short-term, vis-à-vis the current approach, which is epitomized by 
proposals to hire 6,000 ‘cyber warriors’ into DoD or 1,000 new 
personnel into OPM, is that it is will not run into the practical 
resource constraints that are going to face these other proposals 
(namely: that there simply aren’t enough qualified people in work 
force to hire at this level for the medium-term). Indeed, a cost-
benefit analysis will likely find that the cost effectiveness of a 
specialized track is many times less than the alternative, which would 
have the added benefit of freeing up funds to be used for other 
initiatives with the goal of bolstering cyber security.  
D. Improving the Evidence Base 
Compiling transparent, reliable, and statistically rigorous 
cyber security statistics would contribute to better decisions in cyber 
security policy. The problem to date has been that this responsibility 
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has been taken on either by organizations with a stake in stoking 
greater fears about cyber security (e.g. anti-virus companies and 
private security vendors) or with organizations that lack the requisite 
statistical capacity to provide reliable data (e.g. the FBI’s Internet 
Crime Complaint Center). 
This is typical practice in the U.S., where statistics are 
compiled by organizations responsible for the regulation of the sector 
or administration of the sector (e.g. the Federal Aviation Authority 
compiles aviation data, similarly the National Center for Health 
Statistics operates under the Centers for Disease Control). Assigning 
a disinterested party with sufficient statistical capacity and credibility 
to provide an independent assessment of the scale of the problem 
could prove very helpful for beginning to design programs to help 
address these issues. Could the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology play a role, either as a convener or as an authority to 
grant some authority to cyber security data? 
When randomized control trials were applied from medicine 
to the development economics field in the late 1990s, there was a 
need to develop a specialized methodology to respond to the unique 
logistical and ethical issues that arise in international development 
work. Adjustments to randomized control trial methodologies will 
likewise have to be made to adapt them to the unique characteristics 
of cyber security. 
For instance, it isn’t clear how comparable control and 
treatment groups might be identified or separated when so many 
network elements differ across organizations (indeed, even within 
organization the elements are likely to differ). The rate at which the 
technology changes and software is patched might also make it 
difficult to keep the two groups separate and, within the groups, 
maintain consistency across subjects (then again, many organizations 
run on legacy systems that are 10 years old, so this might not be such 
a great obstacle depending on the organization). This might imply 
that the studies might only be able to be conducted at the 
organization-level, though we simply don’t know yet.  
An assessment of the costs of running an experiment would 
be useful. The costs of randomized control trials in cyber security 
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may not be cost-effective. The up-front costs to actually run the 
experiments may not be overwhelming, especially considering the 
multi-billion dollar budgets being allocated at a national level, but the 
cost associated with the losses to the control group may accrue over 
time and offset the potential gains from the experiment (then again, 
given that attackers only need to infiltrate one out of potentially 
thousands of users to compromise a system, perhaps the risk levels 
remain the same whether undertaking an experiment or not, although 
the cost may not).  
A taxonomy of cyber security ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ would 
also have to be developed in order to undertake an experiment. 
Accurate measures for the effects of treatment would also need to be 
developed and established. The goal would be to determine which 
metrics exist and can be reliably measured, or which ones might have 
to be created, in order to measure effectively the various policy 
interventions that could be made to reduce certain cyber security 
risks.  
E. Developing Gaming and Other Table-Top Simulations 
There is a long and established body of work on gaming and 
table-top simulations for crisis situations, even in cyber security. 
Indeed, a recommendation during a panel on mitigating cyber 
security threats at a recent conference at Columbia University was 
that, “simulations, war/business games, and table-top exercises can 
provide additional venues for information sharing and help build 
trust between participants, which can be helpful in crisis 
situations.”53  
Indeed, this is where using the intrinsic strengths of the 
industry itself may be able to potentiate innovative methods for 
training and testing; the use of simulations can prove enormously 
helpful by providing a way to control for many elements while 
                                                 
53 Proceedings of the Conference on Internet Governance and Cyber Security, 
COLUMBIA SCH. OF INT’L AND PUB. AFF. (May 14, 2015), 
https://sipa.columbia.edu/system/files/Proceedings_ColumbiaSIPA_InternetGov
erance_Cybersecurity_Conference2015.pdf. 
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varying one, and being able to do so across many diverse elements 
quickly, either simultaneously or sequentially. Once problematic areas 
are identified using this strategy, more elaborate real time 
experiments can be conducted manipulating potentially problematic 
aspects. Any such simulations could be easily conducted using 
existing Internet based platforms which allow for multi-user 
simultaneous interaction. 
Where new research might be especially useful is in the 
development of methods that combine psychological training and 
emotion regulation training with simulations. The idea would be to 
run through the several stages that comprise risk-based approaches to 
cyber security, such as the NIST Risk Management Framework, so as 
to identify where the failure to successfully implement the framework 
occurs due to panic or individual biases and heuristics, and then 
address these sources of failure.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
We have described the factors that we believe influence 
decision making in the area of cyber security across four main levels 
of analysis: international; national; organizational; and individual. 
Each poses unique challenges to the development of a coherent and 
consistent policy of cyber security.  
After describing what has been done to enhance cyber 
security at each level, and noting the challenges that remain, we have 
suggested some important ways in which policy and research might 
advance policy in more productive ways. These include: establishing a 
coherent national plan with clear and coherent benchmarks and 
policies and plans for implementation and accountability; the 
conscious development of different governance structures for 
regulating the Internet internationally; creating a national service 
action plan for recruiting and circulating cyber talent in and out of 
government; providing a more accurate evidence base of past 
experience to improve future response; and establishing regular 
games and simulations to train people in how to respond to differing 
potential threats.  
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Enhancing cyber security is a critically important project. It 
also appears an overwhelming one on which we have made less 
progress than those who seek to exploit the systems in question. In 
developing systems designed more for overall resiliency than security, 
the architects of the Internet never imagined the widespread use it 
would achieve. However, this resilience has also resulted in 
vulnerabilities that now need to be addressed. It will require a great 
deal of coordinated action on the part of many individuals, users, 
industry and government actors to improve cyber security without 
compromising privacy unduly. Working diligently and creatively to 
achieve such a goal will help make everyone safer and more 
productive. 
 
